E-Business and Management Science: Mutual Impacts (Part 1 of 2)
Management Science
Electronic Commerce Research
Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On neighbor-selection strategy in hybrid peer-to-peer networks
Future Generation Computer Systems - Systems performance analysis and evaluation
Forming efficient agent groups for completing complex tasks
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Decision support for multi-unit combinatorial bundle auctions
Decision Support Systems
Stochastic packing-market planning
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Procurement models in the agricultural supply chain: A case study of online coffee auctions in India
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Combinatorial Reverse Auction based Scheduling in Multi-Rate Wireless Systems
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A test suite for the evaluation of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Journal of Algorithms
A branch-and-cut algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem
Decision Support Systems
Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions
Management Science
Improving efficiency in multiple-unit combinatorial auctions: Bundling bids from multiple bidders
Decision Support Systems
Solving Truckload Procurement Auctions Over an Exponential Number of Bundles
Transportation Science
Combinatorial reverse auction based on revelation of Lagrangian multipliers
Decision Support Systems
A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Resource-driven mission-phasing techniques for constrained agents in stochastic environments
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A public procurement combinatorial auction mechanism with quality assignment
Decision Support Systems
A combinatorial auction negotiation protocol for time-restricted group decisions
ICAIS'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Adaptive and intelligent systems
A Clock-and-Offer Auction Market for Grid Resources When Bidders Face Stochastic Computational Needs
INFORMS Journal on Computing
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Bidder behaviors in repeated B2B procurement auctions
Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Electronic Commerce
Assessing the benefits of group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A mechanism for supporting collective innovation: the open contract-based challenge
Information Systems and e-Business Management
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Combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors. Dealing with these forces trade-offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency, revenue maximization, low transaction costs, fairness, failure freeness, and scalability. Computational complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders, by maintaining fairness in the face of computational limitations, by limiting biddable combinations, and by limiting the use of combinatorial bids. Combinatorial auction designs include single-round, first-price sealed bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms, uniform and market-clearing price auctions, and iterative combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auction designs must deal with exposure problems, threshold problems, ways to keep the bidding moving at a reasonable pace, avoiding and resolving ties, and controlling complexity.