The probabilistic analysis of a heuristic for the assignment problem
SIAM Journal on Computing
Introduction to algorithms
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching
Information Processing Letters
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Searching for Optimal Coalition Structures
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Task Allocation via Multi-Agent Coalition Formation: Taxonomy, Algorithms and Complexity
ICTAI '03 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence
Management Science
Generating Coalition Structures with Finite Bound from the Optimal Guarantees
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The Advantages of Compromising in Coalition Formation with Incomplete Information
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Distributed task allocation in social networks
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Adapting to Changing Resource Requirements for Coalition Formation in Self-Organized Social Networks
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
KES-AMSTA '09 Proceedings of the Third KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
Negotiation with reaction functions for solving complex task allocation problems
IROS'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/RSJ international conference on Intelligent robots and systems
An anytime coalition restructuring algorithm in an open environment
ICIC'07 Proceedings of the intelligent computing 3rd international conference on Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications
Searching for agent coalition using particle swarm optimization and death penalty function
ICIC'07 Proceedings of the intelligent computing 3rd international conference on Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications
Assignment problem in requirements driven agent collaboration and its implementation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
ACIIDS'10 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Intelligent information and database systems: Part II
Modeling in agent oriented internetware framework
Proceedings of the Second Asia-Pacific Symposium on Internetware
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
Complex Task Allocation in Mobile Surveillance Systems
Journal of Intelligent and Robotic Systems
Verifying team formation protocols with probabilistic model checking
CLIMA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Multiagent task allocation in social networks
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Efficient Complex Tasks Allocation within Agents Environment of Known Capabilities
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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In this paper we produce complexity and impossibility results and develop algorithms for a task allocation problem that needs to be solved by a group of autonomous agents working together. In particular, each task is assumed to be composed of several subtasks and involves an associated predetermined and known overall payment (set by the task's owner) for its completion. However, the division of this payment among the corresponding contributors is not predefined. Now to accomplish a particular task, all its subtasks need to be allocated to agents with the necessary capabilities and the agents' corresponding costs need to fall within the preset overall task payment. For this scenario, we first provide a cooperative agent system designer with a practical solution that achieves an efficient allocation. However, this solution is not applicable for non-cooperative settings. Consequently, we go on to provide a detailed analysis where we prove that certain design goals cannot be achieved if the agents are self interested. Specifically, we prove that for the general case, no protocol achieving the efficient solution can exist that is individually rational and budget balanced. We show that although efficient protocols may exist in some settings, these will inevitably be setting-specific.