Linear programming and network flows (2nd ed.)
Linear programming and network flows (2nd ed.)
Modeling competitive bidding: a critical essay
Management Science
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions
Management Science
Decentralized Mechanism Design for Supply Chain Organizations Using an Auction Market
Information Systems Research
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Management Science
Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues
Management Science
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints
Management Science
Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism
Management Science
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Market-Based Optimization Algorithm for Distributed Systems
Management Science
Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
Operations Research
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We address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel “padding” method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this “padding” method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.