Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism

Authors:
Leon Yang Chu;Zuo-Jun Max Shen
Affiliations:
Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089;Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720
Venue:
Management Science
Year:
2006

Citing 2
Cited 5

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market

EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Generalized trade reduction mechanisms

Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Trading networks with price-setting agents

Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategy proof electronic markets

Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions

Management Science
When multi-touch meets streaming

Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Multimedia

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one's true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities.