SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
Management Science
Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism
Management Science
Trading networks with price-setting agents
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions
Management Science
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Two-sided online markets for electric vehicle charging
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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When designing a mechanism there are several desirable properties tomaintain such as incentive compatibility (IC), individual rationality (IR), and budget balance (BB). It is well known [15] that it is impossible for a mechanism to maximize social welfare whilst also being IR, IC, and BB. There have been several attempts to circumvent [15] by trading welfare for BB, e.g.,in domains such as double-sided auctions [13], distributed markets [3] and supply chain problems [2, 4]. In this paper we provide a procedure called a Generalized Trade Reduction (GTR) for single-value players, which given an IR and IC mechanism, outputs a mechanism which is IR, IC and BB with a loss of welfare. We bound the welfare achieved by our procedure for a wide range of domains. In particular, our resultsimprove on existing solutions for problems such as double sidedmarkets with homogenous goods, distributed markets and several kinds of supply chains. Furthermore, our solution provides budget balanced mechanisms for several open problems such as combinatorial double-sided auctions and distributed markets with strategic transportation edges.