Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Decentralized supply chain formation: a market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism design for capacity allocation with price competition
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce
Chain: a dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Truthful multi-attribute auction with discriminatory pricing in cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Cognitive radio architectures for broadband
Truthful multi-attribute auction with discriminatory pricing in cognitive radio networks
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
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With the recent technological feasibility of electronic commerce over the Internet, much attention has been given to the design of electronic markets for various types of electronically-tradable goods. Such markets, however, will normally need to function in some relationship with markets for other related goods, usually those downstream or upstream in the supply chain. Thus, for example, an electronic market for rubber tires for trucks will likely need to be strongly influenced by the rubber market as well as by the truck market. In this paper we design protocols for exchange of information between a sequence of markets along a single supply chain. These protocols allow each of these markets to function separately, while the information exchanged ensures efficient global behavior across the supply chain. Each market that forms a link in the supply chain operates as a double auction, where the bids on one side of the double auction come from bidders in the corresponding segment of the industry, and the bids on the other side are synthetically generated by the protocol to express the combined information from all other links in the chain. The double auctions in each of the markets can be of several types, and we study several variants of incentive compatible double auctions, comparing them in terms of their efficiency and of the market revenue.