A Microeconomic Approach to Optimal Resource Allocation in Distributed Computer Systems
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems
Market-based control
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Exchange-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Capacity allocation with competitive retailers
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Automated online mechanism design and prophet inequalities
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An ironing-based approach to adaptive online mechanism design in single-valued domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Decentralized supply chain formation: a market protocol and competitive equilibrium analysis
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
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Studies on mechanism design mostly focus on a single market where sellers and buyers trade. This paper examines the problem of mechanism design for capacity allocation in two connected markets where a supplier allocates products to a set of retailers and the retailers resale the products to end-users in price competition. We consider the problems of how allocation mechanisms in the upstream market determine the behaviors of markets in the downstream market and how pricing policy in the downstream market influences the properties of allocation mechanisms. We classify an effective range of capacity that influences pricing strategies in the downstream market according to allocated quantities. Within the effective capacity range, we show that the retailers tend to inflate orders under proportional allocation, but submit truthful orders under uniform allocation. We observe that heterogeneous allocations results in greater total retailer profit which is a unique phenomenon in our model. The results would be applied to the design and analysis of Business-to-Business (B2B) marketplaces and supply chain management.