Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
Management Science
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Management Science
A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions
Computers and Operations Research
Combinatorial Auctions
A Branch-and-Price Algorithm and New Test Problems for Spectrum Auctions
Management Science
Reducing Truckload Transportation Costs Through Collaboration
Transportation Science
Pricing in Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problems
Transportation Science
Shipper decision support for the acceptance of bids during the procurement of transport services
ICCL'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Computational logistics
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Truckload carriers provide hundreds of billions of dollars worth of services to shippers in the United States alone each year. Internet auctions provide these shippers with a fast and easy way to negotiate potential contracts with a large number of carriers. Combinatorial auctions have the added benefit of allowing multiple lanes to be considered simultaneously in a single auction. This is important because it enables carriers to connect multiple lanes in continuous moves or tours, decreasing the empty mileage that must be driven, and therefore increasing overall efficiency. On the other hand, combinatorial auctions require bidding on an exponential number of bundles to achieve full economies of scope and scale, which is not tractable except for very small auctions. In most real-world auctions, bidding is instead typically limited to a very small subset of the potential bids. We present an implicit bidding approach to combinatorial auctions for truckload procurement that enables the complete set of all possible bids to be considered implicitly, without placing the corresponding burden of an exponential number of bids on the bidders or the auctioneer. We present the models needed to solve this problem. We then provide extensive computational results to demonstrate the tractability of our approach. Finally, we conclude with numerical analysis to assess the quality of the solutions that are generated and to demonstrate the benefits of our approach over existing bidding methods in practice.