Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
A Web-Based Financial Trading System
Computer
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A branch-and-cut algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem
Decision Support Systems
Solving Truckload Procurement Auctions Over an Exponential Number of Bundles
Transportation Science
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Bidding languages define the means through which participants in an electronic auction define bids and express requirements on their execution. The current state of combinatorial auction market design indicates that no existing bidding language is general enough to support auctions of both divisible and indivisible commodities. In this paper, we propose a novel bidding framework based on a two-level representation of a combined bid. At the inner level, bidding operators impose conditions on the executed proportions of packages of atomic single-item bids. Partial bids defined this way are then recursively combined through logical operators to produce a final combined bid that is submitted to the auctioneer. We present a formal specification of the framework, and analyze how it impacts the mathematical programming formulation of the allocation problem. An application in the context of combinatorial auctions of financial assets illustrates the utilization of the proposed bidding framework.