Improving efficiency in multiple-unit combinatorial auctions: Bundling bids from multiple bidders

Authors:
Murat Köksalan;Riikka-Leena Leskelä;Hannele Wallenius;Jyrki Wallenius
Affiliations:
Middle-East Technical University, Dept. of Industrial Engineering, 06531, Ankara, Turkey;Helsinki University of Technology, Dept. of Industrial Engineering and Management, P.O. Box 5500, 02015 TKK, Finland;Helsinki University of Technology, Dept. of Industrial Engineering and Management, P.O. Box 5500, 02015 TKK, Finland;Helsinki School of Economics, P.O. Box 1210, 00101 Helsinki, Finland
Venue:
Decision Support Systems
Year:
2009

Citing 19
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Abstract

In multiple-unit combinatorial auctions both bidders and bid takers can benefit from support mechanisms that suggest new bids for the bidders. We present a support tool called Group Support Mechanism, which suggests bundles of bids to several bidders not among the provisional winners. It improves upon the Quantity Support Mechanism we developed earlier. The efficiency of the final allocation is better when the Group Support Mechanism is used instead of the Quantity Support Mechanism, especially in cases when the efficient allocation consists of three or more bids.