Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions
Information Technology and Management
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Progress in Linear Programming-Based Algorithms for Integer Programming: An Exposition
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Incompletely specified combinatorial auction: an alternative allocation mechanism for business-to-business negotiations
A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
Management Science
Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance requirement and loll bids through automated agents
Decision Support Systems
Decision support for multi-unit combinatorial bundle auctions
Decision Support Systems
Price discovery in combinatorial auctions using Gibbs sampling
Decision Support Systems
A Heuristic for Winner Determination in Rule-Based Combinatorial Auctions
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Market Segmentation Within Consolidated E-Markets: A Generalized Combinatorial Auction Approach
Journal of Management Information Systems
A branch-and-cut algorithm for the Winner Determination Problem
Decision Support Systems
Improving efficiency in multiple-unit combinatorial auctions: Bundling bids from multiple bidders
Decision Support Systems
Combinatorial reverse auction based on revelation of Lagrangian multipliers
Decision Support Systems
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Assessing the benefits of group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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The migration of auctions to the Internet provides a unique opportunity to harness the power of computing to create new auction forms that were previously impossible. We describe a new type of combinatorial auction that accepts rule-based bids. Allowing bids in the form of high-level rules relieves the buyer from the burden of enumerating all possible acceptable bundles. The allocation of goods requires solving a complex combinatorial problem, a task that is completely impractical in a conventional auction setting. We describe simplifying winner determination heuristics developed in this study to make large problems of this nature manageable.