Combinatorial auctions using rule-based bids

  • Authors:
  • Joni L. Jones;Gary J. Koehler

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Michigan Business School, 701 Tappan St. D5210, Ann Arbor, MI;Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

  • Venue:
  • Decision Support Systems
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

The migration of auctions to the Internet provides a unique opportunity to harness the power of computing to create new auction forms that were previously impossible. We describe a new type of combinatorial auction that accepts rule-based bids. Allowing bids in the form of high-level rules relieves the buyer from the burden of enumerating all possible acceptable bundles. The allocation of goods requires solving a complex combinatorial problem, a task that is completely impractical in a conventional auction setting. We describe simplifying winner determination heuristics developed in this study to make large problems of this nature manageable.