Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on information and computational economics
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial auctions using rule-based bids
Decision Support Systems
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Management Science
Group Buying on the Web: A Comparison of Price-Discovery Mechanisms
Management Science
From Single Static to Multiple Dynamic Combinatorial Auctions
IAT '05 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Using a Lagrangian Heuristic for a Combinatorial Auction Problem
ICTAI '05 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence
Decision support for multi-unit combinatorial bundle auctions
Decision Support Systems
Comparison of the group-buying auction and the fixed pricing mechanism
Decision Support Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
An optimal multiprocessor combinatorial auction solver
Computers and Operations Research
Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Combinatorial reverse auction based on revelation of Lagrangian multipliers
Decision Support Systems
Combinatorial Coalition Formation for multi-item group-buying with heterogeneous customers
Decision Support Systems
Segmenting uncertain demand in group-buying auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Incentive mechanisms, fairness and participation in online group-buying auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Bidder's strategy under group-buying auction on the Internet
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
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Combinatorial reverse auctions represent a popular business model in procurement. For multiple buyers, different procurement models based on combinatorial reverse auctions may be applied. For example, each buyer may hold one combinatorial reverse auction independently. Alternatively, the buyers may delegate the auction to a group-buyer and let the group-buyer hold only one combinatorial reverse auction on behalf of all the buyers. A combination of a combinatorial reverse auctions with the group-buying model makes it possible to reduce the overall cost to acquire the required items significantly due to complementarities between items. However, combinatorial reverse auctions suffer from high computational complexity. To assess the advantage of combining group-buying with combinatorial reverse auctions, three issues must be addressed, including performance, computational efficiency and the scheme to reward the buyers. This motivates us to compare the performance and efficiency of the aforementioned two different combinatorial reverse auction models and to study the possible schemes to reward the buyers. To achieve these objectives, we first illustrate the advantage of group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auctions over multiple independent combinatorial reverse auctions. We then formulate the problems for these two combinatorial reverse auction models and propose solution algorithms for them. We compare performance and computational efficiency for these two combinatorial reverse auction models. Our analysis indicates that a group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auction not only outperforms multiple independent combinatorial reverse auctions but also is more efficient than multiple independent combinatorial reverse auctions. We also propose a non-uniform scheme to reward the buyers in group-buying based combinatorial reverse auctions.