Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Technology and Management
The Effects of Time Pressure on Quality in Software Development: An Agency Model
Information Systems Research
ABSolute: An Intelligent Decision Making Framework for E-Sourcing
WECWIS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Advanced Issues of E-Commerce and Web-Based Information Systems (WECWIS '01)
Agent-based decision support for actual-world procurement scenarios
IAT '03 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
The cost behavior of software defects
Decision Support Systems
Combinatorial Auctions
To be or not to B2B: Evaluating managerial choices for e-procurement channel adoption
Information Technology and Management
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Strategic and competitive information systems
Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
Management Science
Journal of Management Information Systems
Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information: Transaction Risks of Information Exchange
Journal of Management Information Systems
Enabling assisted strategic negotiations in actual-world procurement scenarios
Electronic Commerce Research
Enacting agent-based services for automated procurement
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Relative importance, specific investment and ownership in interorganizational systems
Information Technology and Management
Competing in a flat world: building enterprises for a borderless world
Competing in a flat world: building enterprises for a borderless world
Management Science
Multiple Sourcing and Procurement Process Selection with Bidding Events
Management Science
RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screening
Operations Research
iBundler: an agent-based decision support service for combinatorial negotiations
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Journal of Management Information Systems
iAuctionMaker: a decision support tool for mixed bundling
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Approximation schemes for deal splitting and covering integer programs with multiplicity constraints
Theoretical Computer Science
A rank-and-compare algorithm to detect abnormally low bids in procurement auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Assessing the benefits of group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations
The role of sunk costs in online consumer decision-making
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Practical mechanisms for procurement involve bidding, negotiation, transfer payments and subsidies, and the possibility of verification of unobservable product and service quality. We model two proposed multi-stage procurement mechanisms. One focuses on the auction price that is established, and the other emphasizes price negotiation. Both also emphasize quality and offer incentives for the unobservable level of a supplier's effort, while addressing the buyer's satisfaction. Our results show that, with the appropriate incentive, which we will refer to as a qualityeffort bonus, the supplier will exert more effort to supply higher quality goods or services after winning the procurement auction. We also find that a mechanism incorporating price and quality negotiation improves the supply chain's surplus and generates the possibility of Pareto optimal improvement in comparison to a mechanism that emphasizes the auction price only. From the buyer's perspective though, either mechanism can dominate the other, depending on the circumstances of procurement. Thus, post-auction negotiation may not always be optimal for the buyer, although it always produces first-best goods or service quality outcomes. The buyer's choice between mechanisms will be influenced by different values of the quality effort bonus. For managers in practice, our analysis shows that it is possible to simplify the optimization procedure by using a new approach for selecting the appropriate mechanism and determining what value of the incentive for the supplier makes sense.