Comparison of the group-buying auction and the fixed pricing mechanism
Decision Support Systems
Should we collude? Analyzing the benefits of bidder cooperation in online group-buying auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Combinatorial Coalition Formation for multi-item group-buying with heterogeneous customers
Decision Support Systems
Segmenting uncertain demand in group-buying auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Buyer coalitions on JADE platform
KES'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Knowledge-based and intelligent information and engineering systems - Volume Part I
Forming buyer coalition schemes with ontologies in e-marketplaces
WISS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Web information systems engineering
Forming buyer coalition scheme with connection of a coalition leader
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
Assessing the benefits of group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Real-time bid optimization for group-buying ads
Proceedings of the 21st ACM international conference on Information and knowledge management
Information Systems Frontiers
Do starting and ending effects in fixed-price group-buying differ?
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Seller heterogeneity in electronic marketplaces: A study of new and experienced sellers in eBay
Decision Support Systems
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The group-buying auction is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanism on the Internet. It is a variant of the sellers' price double auction, which makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discounts, i.e., the more bidders bid, the lower the price of the object being auctioned becomes. In this paper, we analyze the group-buying auction under some assumptions, such as that the independent private values (IPVs) model applies and bidders are risk neutral and symmetric, etc., and build an incomplete information dynamic game model to illustrate the bidders' bidding process. It proves that for the bidders there exists a weakly dominant strategy S, i.e., no matter when a bidder arrives at the auction and what the bidding history is, the highest permitted bid price that is no greater than his value to the object is always his optimal bid price but may not be the unique one.