Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Management Science
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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This paper focuses on multi-agent contract formation by automated negotiation. Commonly individuals are not willing to share information or cooperate and negotiation protocols may give way to unwanted strategic behavior. Socially beneficial contract agreements require a lot of negotiation time. Furthermore, possible interdependencies of contract items lead to complex contract spaces which restrain contract agreements. Therefore, we propose a novel negotiation protocol applying combinatorial auctions for contract formation which consider interdependencies and yield a rapid decision rights allocation. Additionally, this market-based approach utilizes Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves-mechanisms which may lead to truthful preference uncovering and information sharing through bids. However, combinatorial auctions have a computational drawback: winner determination is NP-hard. In simulation experiments, two approximation algorithms as well as an optimal computation are tested in comparison with an established negotiation protocol. The results show that our protocol yields an effective solution and requires very short run time.