The Minimum Satisfiability Problem
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an Edge Worth?
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Developing adaptive auction mechanisms
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online)
ICML '06 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine learning
Applying game theory mechanisms in open agent systems with complete information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Do humans identify efficient strategies in structured peer-to-peer systems?
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Learning the IPA market with individual and social rewards
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Algorithms and theory of computation handbook
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A combinatorial auction negotiation protocol for time-restricted group decisions
ICAIS'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Adaptive and intelligent systems
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Approximating optimal combinatorial auctions for complements using restricted welfare maximization
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A qualitative comparison of the suitability of four theorem provers for basic auction theory
CICM'13 Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Intelligent Computer Mathematics
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Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to make the chosen outcome more favorable to themselves. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that the agents are motivated to report their preferences truthfully, and a desirable outcome is chosen. In a recently proposed approach---called automated mechanism design ---a mechanism is computed for the preference aggregation setting at hand. This has several advantages, but the downside is that the mechanism design optimization problem needs to be solved anew each time. Unlike the earlier work on automated mechanism design that studied a benevolent designer, in this paper we study automated mechanism design problems where the designer is self-interested. In this case, the center cares only about which outcome is chosen and what payments are made to it. The reason that the agents' preferences are relevant is that the center is constrained to making each agent at least as well off as the agent would have been had it not participated in the mechanism. In this setting, we show that designing optimal deterministic mechanisms is NP-complete in two important special cases: when the center is interested only in the payments made to it, and when payments are not possible and the center is interested only in the outcome chosen. We then show how allowing for randomization in the mechanism makes problems in this setting computationally easy. Finally, we show that the payment-maximizing AMD problem is closely related to an interesting variant of the optimal (revenue-maximizing) combinatorial auction design problem, where the bidders have "best-only" preferences. We show that here, too, designing an optimal deterministic auction is NP-complete, but designing an optimal randomized auction is easy.