The temporal logic of reactive and concurrent systems
The temporal logic of reactive and concurrent systems
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Temporal verification of reactive systems: safety
Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifying Compliance with Commitment Protocols
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A Verification Framework for Agent Communication
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Guaranteeing Properties for E-commerce Systems
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Run the GAMUT: A Comprehensive Approach to Evaluating Game-Theoretic Algorithms
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms
Journal of Logic and Computation
A rule-based approach to norm-oriented programming of electronic institutions
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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Game theory is a popular tool for designing interaction protocols for agent systems. It is currently not clear how to extend this to open agent systems. By "open" we mean that foreign agents will be free to enter and leave different systems at will. This means that agents will need to be able to work with previously unseen protocols. There does not yet exist any agreement on a standard way in which such protocols can be specified and published. Furthermore, it is not clear how an agent could be given the ability to use an arbitrary published protocol; the agent would need to be able to work out a strategy for participation. To address this we propose a machine readable language in which a game theory mechanism can be written in the form of an agent interaction protocol. This language allows the workings of the protocol to be made public so that agents can inspect it to determine its properties and hence their best strategy. Enabling agents to automatically determine the game theoretic properties of an arbitrary interaction protocol is difficult. Rather than requiring agents to find the equilibrium of a game, we propose that a recommended equilibrium will be published along with the protocol; agents can then check the recommendation to decide if it is indeed an equilibrium. We present an algorithm for this decision problem. We also develop an equilibrium which simplifies the complexity of the checking problem, while still being robust to unilateral deviations.