Do humans identify efficient strategies in structured peer-to-peer systems?

Authors:
Stephan Schosser;Klemens Böhm;Bodo Vogt
Affiliations:
Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Karlsruhe;Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Karlsruhe;Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg, Magdeburg
Venue:
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Year:
2008

Citing 7
Cited 1

Algorithms, games, and the internet

STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A scalable content-addressable network

Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions

EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A survey of peer-to-peer content distribution technologies

ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Incentives engineering for structured P2P systems - a feasibility demonstration using economic experiments

EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

IEEE Intelligent Systems
Indirect partner interaction in peer-to-peer networks: stimulating cooperation by means of structure

Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Online vs. Offline Behavior: How to Design Strategic Agents for Distributed Coordinator-Free Environments

WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In the last years, distributed coordinator-free systems, e.g., peer-to-peer systems (P2P systems), have attracted much interest among researchers and practitioners. In these systems it is difficult to motivate participants to cooperate. To this end, researchers have proposed various incentive mechanisms. In this paper we are interested in the following question: Do human beings indeed use the strategies that are rational in presence of the incentive mechanism? As humans control the agents in distributed coordinator-free systems, e.g., the peers in peer-to-peer systems, answering this question is essential. We conduct human experiments in the context of structured P2P systems to answer it. This paper shows that humans tend to find it difficult to resort to the strategies expected by the system designer.