A scalable content-addressable network
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Chord: a scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
An incentive compatible reputation mechanism
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Limited reputation sharing in P2P systems
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
TrustGuard: countering vulnerabilities in reputation management for decentralized overlay networks
WWW '05 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Dubious feedback: fair or not?
InfoScale '06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Scalable information systems
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
Towards truthful feedback in p2p data structures
ODBASE'06/OTM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 Confederated international conference on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: CoopIS, DOA, GADA, and ODBASE - Volume Part I
“CONFESS”. eliciting honest feedback without independent verification authorities
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Do humans identify efficient strategies in structured peer-to-peer systems?
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Competition vs. Fairness - Analyzing Structured Networks by Means of User Experiments
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 01
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
The Network Game: Analyzing Network-Formation and Interaction Strategies in Tandem
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Incentivizing connectivity in structured Peer-to-Peer systems
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
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Structured P2P systems are a prominent representative of a class of systems where participants communicate via a given structure. Peers in such systems must show cooperative behavior, to avoid performance degradation of the system. Economic literature has proposed various mechanisms to stimulate cooperation. Their effectiveness strongly depends on the interaction scenario. The two important scenarios are the partner scenario, where participants interact repeatedly, and the stranger scenario, where participants tend to interact only once. The use of shared histories is beneficial in the stranger scenario, but it is not necessary in the partner scenario. This paper is based on the observation that the systems investigated here do not match either of these scenarios. Thus, we propose indirect partner interaction as a new interaction scenario, i.e., peers interact indirectly via a sequence of peers. To study peer behavior in this new scenario without any assumptions, we have carried out economic experiments. They give way to the following results: Participants interacting on behalf of strangers show roughly the same degree of cooperative behavior as with the other mechanisms examined, like partner design or punishment. While participants tend to rely on the shared history if no other information is available, they use the network structure as basis for their strategic decisions whenever possible. The presence of a shared history does not lead to an increase of the payoff earned in such a system. We conclude that the settings investigated here do not need shared histories to stimulate cooperation.