“CONFESS”. eliciting honest feedback without independent verification authorities

Authors:
Radu Jurca;Boi Faltings
Affiliations:
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (LIA), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland;Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (LIA), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland
Venue:
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Year:
2004

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Abstract

Reputation mechanisms offer an efficient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. In the absence of independent verification authorities that can reveal the true outcome of a transaction, market designers have to ensure that it is in the best interest of the trading agents to report the behavior in transactions truthfully. As opposed to side-payment schemes that correlate a present report with future reports submitted about the same agent, we present a mechanism we have called “CONFESS”, that discovers (in equilibrium) the true outcome of a transaction by analyzing the two reports coming from the agents involved in the exchange. For two long-run rational agents, we show that it is possible to design such a mechanism that makes cooperation a stable equilibrium.