Communications of the ACM
Challenges in Large-Scale Open Agent Mediated Economies
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
WI '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence
Reputation-based pricing of P2P services
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Online trust and reputation systems
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Modeling trust using transactional, numerical units
Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust: Bridge the Gap Between PST Technologies and Business Services
A Trust-Based Incentive Mechanism for E-Marketplaces
Trust in Agent Societies
Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A self-organized, fault-tolerant and scalable replication scheme for cloud storage
Proceedings of the 1st ACM symposium on Cloud computing
An architectural approach to composing reputation-based distributed services
ECSA'10 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Software architecture
Reputation inflation detection in a Chinese C2C market
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive compatible reputation mechanisms
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
“CONFESS”. eliciting honest feedback without independent verification authorities
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Combining Trust Modeling And Mechanism Design For Promoting Honesty In E-Marketplaces
Computational Intelligence
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Most online feedback mechanisms publish unbiased statistics (usually averages) of past ratings. Such mechanisms fail in environments where the same seller sells products of many different qualities, such as marketplaces of used cars and collectibles. This paper presents a novel feedback management mechanism that succeeds in facilitating efficient transactions in such settings. One particularly interesting aspect of this mechanism is that it uses the threat of biased future reporting of quality in order to induce sellers to truthfully declare the quality of their items.