Notions of reputation in multi-agents systems: a review
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
An incentive compatible reputation mechanism
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
CONFESS " An Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanism for the Online Hotel Booking Industry
CEC '04 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
The Network Game: Analyzing Network-Formation and Interaction Strategies in Tandem
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
Electronic Commerce Research
MTrust: a reputation-based trust model for a mobile agent system
ATC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
Optimizing an incentives' mechanism for truthful feedback in virtual communities
AP2PC'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
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Reputation mechanisms offer an efficient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. Feedback about an agent's past behavior can be aggregated into a measure of reputation, and used by other agents for taking trust decisions. Unfortunately, true feedback cannot be automatically assumed. In the absence of Trusted Third Parties, the mechanism has to make it rational for agents to truthfully share reputation information. In this paper we describe two mechanisms that can be used in decentralized environments for eliciting true feedback. The mechanisms are accompanied by examples inspired by real scenarios.