Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
WI '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence
An incentive mechanism for eliciting fair ratings of sellers in e-marketplaces
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A Trust-Based Incentive Mechanism for E-Marketplaces
Trust in Agent Societies
Design of a mechanism for promoting honesty in E-marketplaces
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
An incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in e-marketplaces
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Incentivizing connectivity in structured Peer-to-Peer systems
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Acquaintance-based trust model for the evolution of cooperation in business games
Service Oriented Computing and Applications
Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive compatible reputation mechanisms
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
An incentive mechanism to reinforce truthful reports in reputation systems
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Combining Trust Modeling And Mechanism Design For Promoting Honesty In E-Marketplaces
Computational Intelligence
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Reputation mechanisms provide a promising alternative to the traditional security methods for preventing malicious behavior in online transactions. However, obtaining correct reputation information is not trivial. In the absence of objective authorities (or trusted third parties) which can oversee every transaction, mechanism designers have to ensure that it is rational for the participating parties to report the truth. In this paper we describe a complete reputation mechanism for the online hotel booking industry that is efficient (i.e. the equilibrium behavior is cooperative) and incentive compatible. Our mechanism discovers the true outcome of an interaction by analyzing the two reports coming from the agents involved in the interaction. Based on side payments, such a mechanism makes it profitable for long-run agents to commit to always report the truth.