Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system
Proceedings of the tenth international conference on Information and knowledge management
Proceedings of the workshop on Deception, Fraud, and Trust in Agent Societies held during the Autonomous Agents Conference: Trust in Cyber-societies, Integrating the Human and Artificial Perspectives
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
CONFESS " An Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanism for the Online Hotel Booking Industry
CEC '04 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
An incentives' mechanism promoting truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
CCGRID '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid - Volume 01
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Using CHI-scores to reward honest feedback from repeated interactions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful opinions from the crowds
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Eliciting honest reputation feedback in a Markov setting
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
On a linear framework for belief dynamics in multi-agent environments
CLIMA VII'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
A versatile approach to combining trust values for making binary decisions
iTrust'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust Management
An incentive mechanism to reinforce truthful reports in reputation systems
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
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We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports.