The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
CONFESS " An Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanism for the Online Hotel Booking Industry
CEC '04 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
Trusted P2P Transactions with Fuzzy Reputation Aggregation
IEEE Internet Computing
An incentives' mechanism promoting truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
CCGRID '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid - Volume 01
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
ARES '07 Proceedings of the The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Experience with an object reputation system for peer-to-peer filesharing
NSDI'06 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 3
One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
H-Trust: A Robust and Lightweight Group Reputation System for Peer-to-Peer Desktop Grid
ICDCSW '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
GossipTrust for Fast Reputation Aggregation in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
VectorTrust: Trust Vector Aggregation Scheme for Trust Management in Peer-to-Peer Networks
ICCCN '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Proceedings of 18th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks
Analysis of a Hybrid Reputation Management System for Mobile Ad hoc Networks
ICCCN '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Proceedings of 18th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks
Taxonomy of trust: Categorizing P2P reputation systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Management in peer-to-peer systems
H-trust: a group trust management system for pee-to-peer desktop grid
Journal of Computer Science and Technology - Special section on trust and reputation management in future computing systmes and applications
Mobicent: a credit-based incentive system for disruption tolerant network
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Pricing and incentives in peer-to-peer networks
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
A collaboration-based autonomous reputation system for email services
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
INPAC: an enforceable incentive scheme for wireless networks using network coding
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
cTrust: trust aggregation in cyclic mobile ad hoc networks
Euro-Par'10 Proceedings of the 16th international Euro-Par conference on Parallel processing: Part II
Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive compatible reputation mechanisms
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Editorial: Special issue on trusted computing and communications
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
A dynamic reputation system with built-in attack resilience to safeguard buyers in e-market
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes
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The success of current trust and reputation systems is on the premise that the truthful feedbacks are obtained. However, without appropriate mechanisms, in most reputation systems, silent and lying strategies usually yield higher payoffs for peers than truthful feedback strategies. Thus, to ensure trustworthiness, incentive mechanisms are highly needed for a reputation system to encourage rational peers to provide truthful feedbacks. In this paper, we model the feedback reporting process in a reputation system as a reporting game. We propose a wage-based incentive mechanism for enforcing truthful report for non-verifiable information in self-interested P2P networks. A set of incentive compatibility constraint rules including participation constraint and self-selection constraints are formulated. We design, implement, and analyze incentive mechanisms and players' strategies. The extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanisms reinforce truthful feedbacks and achieve optimal welfare.