Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Web services on demand: WSLA-driven automated management
IBM Systems Journal
Fighting peer-to-peer SPAM and decoys with object reputation
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Reputation-based pricing of P2P services
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Coping with inaccurate reputation sources: experimental analysis of a probabilistic trust model
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
An incentives' mechanism promoting truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
CCGRID '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid - Volume 01
Reputation-Based service level agreements for web services
ICSOC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Service-Oriented Computing
Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive compatible reputation mechanisms
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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Online communities increasingly rely on reputation information to foster cooperation and deter cheating. As rational agents can often benefit from misreporting their observations, explicit incentives must be created to reward honest feedback. Reputation side-payments (e.g., agents get paid for submitting feedback) can be designed to make truth-telling optimal. In this paper, we present a new side-payment scheme adapted for settings where agents repeatedly submit feedback. We rate the feedback set of an agent, rather than individual reports. The CHI-Score of the feedback set is computed based on a Chi-square independence test that assesses the correlation between the agent's feedback and the feedback submitted by the rest of the community. The mechanism has intuitive appeal and generates significantly lower costs than existing incentive-compatible reporting mechanisms.