Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system
Proceedings of the tenth international conference on Information and knowledge management
Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Service-Oriented Computing: Key Concepts and Principles
IEEE Internet Computing
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Using CHI-scores to reward honest feedback from repeated interactions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM international workshop on Web information and data management
A reputation-based system model for P2P networks
ACST'07 Proceedings of the third conference on IASTED International Conference: Advances in Computer Science and Technology
Resource Aggregation Effectiveness in Peer-to-Peer Architectures
GPC '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
Incentive compatible mechanism in P2P systems
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
A game theoretic framework for peer-to-peer market economy
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
GPC'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
Future Generation Computer Systems
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In the future peer-to-peer service oriented computing systems, maintaining a cooperative equilibrium is a non-trivial task. In the absence of Trusted Third Parties (TTP's) or verification authorities, rational service providers minimize their costs by providing ever degrading service quality levels. Anticipating this, rational clients are willing to pay only the minimum amounts (often zero) which leads to the collapse of the market.In this paper, we show how a simple reputation mechanism can be used to overcome this moral hazard problem. The mechanism does not act by social exclusion (i.e. exclude providers that cheat) but rather by allowing flexible service level agreements in which quality can be traded for the price. We show that such a mechanism can drive service providers of different types to exert the social efficient effort levels.