Pricing web services

Authors:
Kevin Ho;John Sum;Gilbert S. Young
Affiliations:
Department of Information Management, Chung Shan Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan, ROC;Department of Information Management, Chung Shan Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan, ROC;Department of Computer Science, Cal State Poly Pomona, CA
Venue:
GPC'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing
Year:
2006

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Abstract

In this paper, a preliminary survey on the utilization of combinatorial auction as a mechanism for the allocation and the Gomory-Baumol price and the Shapley value as a pricing mechanism for web services is presented. It is shown that Gomory-Baumol price is in general unable to determine the prices for the individual service, even though the services can be optimally allocated. Except when the solution of the allocation problem is integral, the condition for which the Gomory-Baumol price could be determined is unclear. On the other hand, it is found that Shapley value could be applied to price individual service. By allowing the service providers setting reserve prices on their services, it can guarantee that the price is individual rational.