Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Fighting peer-to-peer SPAM and decoys with object reputation
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Coping with inaccurate reputation sources: experimental analysis of a probabilistic trust model
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
QoS-Based service selection and ranking with trust and reputation management
OTM'05 Proceedings of the 2005 Confederated international conference on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems - Volume >Part I
Reputation-Based service level agreements for web services
ICSOC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Service-Oriented Computing
Enforcing truthful strategies in incentive compatible reputation mechanisms
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Self-policing mobile ad hoc networks by reputation systems
IEEE Communications Magazine
Reliable QoS monitoring based on client feedback
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback payments
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Association-based dynamic computation of reputation in web services
International Journal of Web and Grid Services
Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful opinions from the crowds
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
ReMan: A pro-active reputation management infrastructure for composite Web services
ICSE '09 Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Software Engineering
Obtaining reliable feedback for sanctioning reputation mechanisms
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Mechanisms for making crowds truthful
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Automated design of multistage mechanisms
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Eliciting honest reputation feedback in a Markov setting
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Trust-Oriented Composite Service Selection and Discovery
ICSOC-ServiceWave '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Service-Oriented Computing
On a linear framework for belief dynamics in multi-agent environments
CLIMA VII'06 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Reputation in multi agent systems and the incentives to provide feedback
MATES'10 Proceedings of the 8th German conference on Multiagent system technologies
Ethics and Information Technology
Effective Usage of Computational Trust Models in Rational Environments
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
Peer prediction without a common prior
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Future Generation Computer Systems
Eliciting high quality feedback from crowdsourced tree networks using continuous scoring rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
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Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and the potential gains that can be obtained from lying. Side-payment schemes (monetary rewards for submitted feedback) can make truth-telling rational based on the correlation between the reports of different buyers.In this paper we use the idea of automated mechanism design to construct the payments that minimize the budget required by an incentive-compatible reputation mechanism. Such payment schemes are defined by a linear optimization problem that can be solved efficiently in realistic settings. Furthermore, we investigate two directions for further lowering the cost of incentive-compatibility: using several reference reports to construct the side-payments, and filtering out reports that are probably false.