The small-world phenomenon: an algorithmic perspective
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A scalable content-addressable network
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Universal classes of hash functions (Extended Abstract)
STOC '77 Proceedings of the ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Analyzing peer-to-peer traffic across large networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
CONFESS " An Incentive Compatible Reputation Mechanism for the Online Hotel Booking Industry
CEC '04 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentives to Cooperate in Network Formation
Computational Economics
From Local Behaviors to the Dynamics in an Agent Network
WI '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence
Indirect partner interaction in peer-to-peer networks: stimulating cooperation by means of structure
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The influence limiter: provably manipulation-resistant recommender systems
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM conference on Recommender systems
The Dangers of Poorly Connected Peers in Structured P2P Networks and a Solution Based on Incentives
WI '07 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence
A survey and comparison of peer-to-peer overlay network schemes
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Peer-to-Peer systems (P2P systems) have received much attention both in research and in practice. P2P systems consist of autonomous entities, as peers are software artifacts chosen and controlled by humans, or they may be humans themselves, as in social networks. Thus, a peer can choose (a) its action-selection strategy, i.e., how it deals with queries on behalf of others, and (b) its link-selection strategy. In so-called structured P2P systems, a peer typically does not interact directly with another one on the application level, but forwards its queries via intermediate peers. Peers in P2P systems expect some benefit from participating. In particular, they benefit if the system is efficient, i.e., if the payoff of all participants is maximal. Since maintaining contacts incurs costs, having only few contacts is attractive. Consequently, we expect some peers to be deliberately poorly connected (dpc): They hardly have any contacts and hence low maintenance costs. Still, a dpc peer benefits from the network structure, since other peers forward its queries via their contacts. In other words, dpc is a new kind of free riding behavior, namely on the contact level (as opposed to free riding on the action level). Since, from a global perspective, a lower degree of connectivity and a higher forwarding load than necessary result, dpc reduces efficiency. In this article we introduce a formal model to show that in many situations dpc indeed leads to a higher payoff than having many links, i.e., cooperation. Further, we show by means of an economic experiment that humans actually do resort to dpc in network-formation situations. To deal with this situation, we propose an incentive mechanism against dpc. The idea is that participants are more cooperative against peers which obviously are not dpc, compared to other peers. We show the effectiveness of our mechanism with a formal analysis.