Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computing and using reputations for internet ratings
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system
Proceedings of the tenth international conference on Information and knowledge management
Web-Based Reputation Management Systems: Problems and Suggested Solutions
Electronic Commerce Research
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Managing and Sharing Servents' Reputations in P2P Systems
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
WI '04 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence
Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard
Information Systems Research
An incentives' mechanism promoting truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
CCGRID '05 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid - Volume 01
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
CAT: a context-aware trust model for open and dynamic systems
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing
GossipTrust for Fast Reputation Aggregation in Peer-to-Peer Networks
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Boosting collaborative filtering based on statistical prediction errors
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM conference on Recommender systems
Collective revelation: a mechanism for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sybilproof transitive trust protocols
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Reputation-based policies that provide the right incentives in peer-to-peer environments
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Management in peer-to-peer systems
Simulating the effect of reputation systems on E-markets
iTrust'03 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trust management
P2P Reputation Management Using Distributed Identities and Decentralized Recommendation Chains
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Optimizing an incentives' mechanism for truthful feedback in virtual communities
AP2PC'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We propose a mechanism for providing the incentives for reporting truthful feedback in a peer-to-peer system for exchanging services (or content). This mechanism is to complement reputation mechanisms that employ ratings' feedback on the various transactions in order to provide incentives to peers for offering better services to others. Under our approach, each of the transacting peers (rather than just the client) submits a rating on the performance of their mutual transaction. If these are in disagreement, then both transacting peers are punished, since such an occasion is a sign that one of them is lying. The severity of each peer's punishment is determined by his corresponding non-credibility metric; this is maintained by the mechanism and evolves according to the peer's record. When under punishment, a peer does not transact with others. We model the punishment effect of the mechanism in a peer-to-peer system as a Markov chain that is experimentally proved to be very accurate. According to this model, the credibility mechanism leads the peer-to-peer system to a desirable steady state isolating liars. Then, we define a procedure for the optimization of the punishment parameters of the mechanism for peer-to-peer systems of various characteristics. We experimentally prove that this optimization procedure is effective and necessary for the successful employment of the mechanism in real peer-to-peer systems. Then, the optimized credibility mechanism is combined with reputation-based policies to provide a complete solution for high performance and truthful rating in peer-to-peer systems. The combined mechanism was experimentally proved to deal very effectively with large fractions of collaborated liar peers that follow static or dynamic rational lying strategies in peer-to-peer systems with dynamically renewed population, while the efficiency loss induced to sincere peers by the presence of liars is diminished. Finally, we describe the potential implementation of the mechanism in real peer-to-peer systems.