Pretty good privacy: public key encryption for the masses
Building in big brother
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Sybilproof reputation mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
The influence limiter: provably manipulation-resistant recommender systems
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM conference on Recommender systems
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The information cost of manipulation-resistance in recommender systems
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM conference on Recommender systems
Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
Electronic Commerce Research
Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long way
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Aiding the detection of fake accounts in large scale social online services
NSDI'12 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
An efficient incentive scheme with a distributed authority infrastructure in peer-to-peer networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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We study protocols to enable one user (the principal) to make potentially profitable but risky interactions with another user (the agent), in the absence of direct trust between the two parties. In such situations, it is possible to enable the interaction indirectly through a chain of credit or "trust" links. We introduce a model that provides insight into many disparate applications, including open currency systems, network trust aggregation systems, and manipulation-resistant recommender systems. Each party maintains a trust account for each other party. When a principal's trust balance for an agent is high enough to cover potential losses from a bad interaction, direct trust is sufficient to enable the interaction. Allowing indirect trust opens up more interaction opportunities, but also expands the strategy space of an attacker seeking to exploit the community for its own ends. We show that with indirect trust exchange protocols, some friction is unavoidable: any protocol that satisfies a natural strategic safety property that we call sum-sybilproofness can sometimes lead to a reduction in expected overall trust balances even on interactions that are profitable in expectation. Thus, for long-term growth of trust accounts, which are assets enabling risky but valuable interactions, it may be necessary to limit the use of indirect trust. We present the hedged-transitive protocol and show that it achieves the optimal rate of expected growth in trust accounts, among all protocols satisfying the sum-sybilproofness condition.