Propagation of trust and distrust
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide Web
TrustDavis: A Non-Exploitable Online Reputation System
CEC '05 Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology
A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Enumerating degree sequences in digraphs and a cycle-cocycle reversing system
European Journal of Combinatorics
Optimizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruists
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combating web spam with trustrank
VLDB '04 Proceedings of the Thirtieth international conference on Very large data bases - Volume 30
Ostra: leveraging trust to thwart unwanted communication
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Sybilproof transitive trust protocols
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Signed networks in social media
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Mechanism design on trust networks
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
P2P trading in social networks: the value of staying connected
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Canal: scaling social network-based Sybil tolerance schemes
Proceedings of the 7th ACM european conference on Computer Systems
Strategic formation of credit networks
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
TrustBets: betting over an IOU network
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Defending against large-scale crawls in online social networks
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
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Credit networks represent a way of modeling trust between entities in a network. Nodes in the network print their own currency and trust each other for a certain amount of each other's currency. This allows the network to serve as a decentralized payment infrastructure---arbitrary payments can be routed through the network by passing IOUs between trusting nodes in their respective currencies---and obviates the need for a common currency. Nodes can repeatedly transact with each other and pay for the transaction using trusted currency. A natural question to ask in this setting is: how long can the network sustain liquidity, i.e. how long can the network support the routing of payments before credit dries up? We answer this question in terms of the long term failure probability of transactions for various network topologies and credit values. We prove that the transaction failure probability is independent of the path along which transactions are routed. We show that under symmetric transaction rates, the transaction failure probability in a number of well-known graph families goes to zero as the size, density or credit capacity of the network increases. We also show via simulations that even networks of small size and credit capacity can route transactions with high probability if they are well-connected. Further, we characterize a centralized currency system as a special type of a star network (one where edges to the root have infinite credit capacity, and transactions occur only between leaf nodes) and compute the steady-state transaction failure probability in a centralized system. We show that liquidity in star networks, complete graphs and Erdos-Renyi networks is comparable to that in equivalent centralized currency systems; thus we do not lose much liquidity in return for their robustness and decentralized properties.