Mariposa: a wide-area distributed database system
The VLDB Journal — The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
Efficiency and nash equilibria in a scrip system for P2P networks
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Mirage: a microeconomic resource allocation system for sensornet testbeds
EmNets '05 Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE workshop on Embedded Networked Sensors
Fileteller: paying and getting paid for file storage
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Beyond nash equilibrium: solution concepts for the 21st century
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Computational challenges in e-commerce
Communications of the ACM - Rural engineering development
Peer-assisted content distribution with prices
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Antfarm: efficient content distribution with managed swarms
NSDI'09 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX symposium on Networked systems design and implementation
Prices are right: managing resources and incentives in peer-assisted content distribution
IPTPS'08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long way
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multiagent learning in large anonymous games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Economics of BitTorrent communities
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Token economy for online exchange systems
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
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We discuss the design of efficient scrip systems and develop tools for empirically analyzing them. For those interested in the empirical study of scrip systems, we demonstrate how characteristics of agents in a system can be inferred from the equilibrium distribution of money. From the perspective of a system designer, we examine the effect of the money supply on social welfare and show that social welfare is maximizedby increasing the money supply up to the point that the system experiences a "monetary crash," where money is sufficiently devalued that no agent is willing to perform a service. We alsoexamine the implications of the presence of altruists and hoarders on the performance of the system. While a small number of altruists may improve social welfare, too many can also cause the system to experience a monetary crash, which may be bad for social welfare. Hoarders generally decrease social welfare but, surprisingly, they also promote system stability by helping prevent monetary crashes. In addition, we provide new technical tools for analyzing and computing equilibria by showing that our model exhibits strategic complementarities, which implies that there exist equilibria in pure strategies that can be computed efficiently.