Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Combinatorial Information Market Design
Information Systems Frontiers
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimizing the Placement of Internet TAPs in Wireless Neighborhood Networks
ICNP '04 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Yoopick: a combinatorial sports prediction market
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 3
Bazaar: strengthening user reputations in online marketplaces
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long way
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized machine activation problems
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Canal: scaling social network-based Sybil tolerance schemes
Proceedings of the 7th ACM european conference on Computer Systems
A competence bartering platform for learners
ICWL'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Advances in Web-Based Learning
Strategic formation of credit networks
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
TrustBets: betting over an IOU network
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Defending against large-scale crawls in online social networks
Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
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We introduce the concept of a trust network--a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed links between pairs of agents, with capacities that are related to the credit an agent is willing to extend another; payments may be routed between any two agents that are connected by a path in the network. The network structure introduces group budget constraints on the payments from a subset of agents to another on the trust network: this generalizes the notion of individually budget constrained bidders. We consider a multi-unit auction of identical items among bidders with unit demand, when the auctioneer and bidders are all nodes on a trust network. We define a generalized notion of social welfare for such budget-constrained bidders, and show that the winner determination problem under this notion of social welfare is NP-hard; however the flow structure in a trust network can be exploited to approximate the solution with a factor of 1 -1/e. We then present a pricing scheme that leads to an incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism with feasible payments that respect the trust network's payment constraints and that maximizes the modified social welfare to within a factor 1-1/e.