A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy

  • Authors:
  • Christina Aperjis;Ramesh Johari

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Stanford University, Stanford, CA

  • Venue:
  • GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We formulate a peer-to-peer system for filesharing as an exchange economy: a price is associated with each file, and users exchange files only when they can afford it. This formulation solves the free-riding problem, since uploading files is a necessary condition for being able to download. However, we do not explicitly introduce a currency; users must upload files in order to earn a budget for downloading. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and dynamic stability of the competitive equilibrium, which is always guaranteed to be Pareto efficient. In addition, a novel aspect of our approach is an allocation mechanism for clearing the market out of equilibrium. We analyze this mechanism when users can anticipate how their actions affect the allocation mechanism (price anticipating behavior). For this regime we characterize the Nash equilibria that will occur, and show that as the number of users increases, the Nash equilibrium rates become approximately Pareto efficient.