Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Measurement, modeling, and analysis of a peer-to-peer file-sharing workload
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Exchange-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More
The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More
Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
I tube, you tube, everybody tubes: analyzing the world's largest user generated content video system
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Bounds on the Performance of P2P Networks Using Tit-for-Tat Strategies
P2P '07 Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Dandelion: cooperative content distribution with robust incentives
ATC'07 2007 USENIX Annual Technical Conference on Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference
One hop reputations for peer to peer file sharing workloads
NSDI'08 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
Peer-assisted content distribution with prices
CoNEXT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
Social and Economic Networks
Content availability and bundling in swarming systems
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
FairTorrent: bringing fairness to peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
Market design & analysis for a P2P backup system
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Reciprocity and barter in peer-to-peer systems
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
P2P trading in social networks: the value of staying connected
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
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Users of the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol and its variants are incentivized to contribute their upload capacity in a bilateral manner: Downloading is possible in return for uploading to the same user. An alternative is to use multilateral exchange to match user demand for content to available supply at other users in the system. We provide a formal comparison of peer-to-peer system designs based on bilateral exchange with those that enable multilateral exchange via a price-based market mechanism to match supply and demand. First, we compare the two types of exchange in terms of the equilibria that arise. A multilateral equilibrium allocation is Pareto-efficient, while we demonstrate that bilateral equilibrium allocations are not Pareto-efficient in general. We show that Pareto efficiency represents the "gap" between bilateral and multilateral equilibria: A bilateral equilibrium allocation corresponds to a multilateral equilibrium allocation if and only if it is Pareto-efficient. Our proof exploits the fact that Pareto efficiency implies reversibility of an appropriately constructed Markov chain. Second, we compare the two types of exchange through the expected percentage of users that can trade in a large system, assuming a fixed file popularity distribution. Our theoretical results as well as analysis of a BitTorrent dataset provide quantitative insight into regimes where bilateral exchange may perform quite well even though it does not always give rise to Pareto-efficient equilibrium allocations.