A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks
NOSSDAV '03 Proceedings of the 13th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
Free Riding on Gnutella Revisited: The Bell Tolls?
IEEE Distributed Systems Online
A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Proportional response dynamics leads to market equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Measurements, analysis, and modeling of BitTorrent-like systems
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Dandelion: cooperative content distribution with robust incentives
ATC'07 2007 USENIX Annual Technical Conference on Proceedings of the USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
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Peer-assisted content distribution matches user demand for content with available supply at other peers in the network. Inspired by this supply-and-demand interpretation of the nature of content sharing, we employ price theory to study peer-assisted content distribution. In this approach, the market-clearing prices are those which exactly align supply and demand, and the system is studied through the characterization of price equilibria. We rigorously analyze the efficiency and robustness gains that are enabled by price-based multilateral exchange. We show that multilateral exchanges satisfy several desirable efficiency and robustness properties that bilateral exchanges do not, e.g. , equilibria in bilateral exchange may fail to exist, be inefficient if they do exist, and fail to remain robust to collusive deviations even if they are Pareto efficient. Further, we show that an equilibrium in bilateral exchange corresponds to a multilateral exchange equilibrium if and only if it is robust to deviations by coalitions of users.