The Imposition of Protocols Over Open Distributed Systems
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
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Economic principles of multi-agent systems
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Electronic Commerce: From Economic and Game-Theoretic Models to Working Protocols
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Satisfaction balanced mediation
Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on Conference on information and knowledge management
Managing virtual money for satisfaction and scale up in P2P systems
DaMaP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 international workshop on Data management in peer-to-peer systems
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
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Artificial Intelligence
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
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Mechanism design with execution uncertainty
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
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We introduce a new notion, related to auctions and mechanism design, called fair imposition. In this setting a center wishes to fairly and efficiently allocate tasks among a set of agents, not knowing their cost structure. As in the study of auctions, the main abstacle to overcome is the self-interest of the agents, which will in general cause them to hide their true costs. Unlike the auction setting, however, here the center has the power to impose arbitrary behavior on the agents, and furthermore wishes to distribute the cost as fairly as possible among them. We define the problem precisely, present solution criteria for these problems (the central of which is called k-efficiency), and present both positive results (in the form of concrete protocols) and negative results (in the form of impossibility theorems) concerning these criteria.