Theory of linear and integer programming
Theory of linear and integer programming
A linear time algorithm for finding tree-decompositions of small treewidth
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The Complexity of Counting in Sparse, Regular, and Planar Graphs
SIAM Journal on Computing
Arbitration (or How to Merge Knowledge Bases)
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
JSSPP '02 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Job Scheduling Strategies for Parallel Processing
Distributed Problem-Solving as Concurrent Theorem Proving
Proceedings of the 8th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World: Multi-Agent Rationality
Planning for Distributed Theorem Proving: The Teamwork Approach
KI '96 Proceedings of the 20th Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A prototype infrastructure for distributed robot-agent-person teams
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Self-organization through bottom-up coalition formation
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Subexponential parameterized algorithms on bounded-genus graphs and H-minor-free graphs
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Multi-attribute coalitional games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Exact algorithms and applications for Tree-like Weighted Set Cover
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
The Complexity of Power-Index Comparison
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Overlapping coalition formation for efficient data fusion in multi-sensor networks
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the dimensionality of voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'85 Proceedings of the 9th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
The least-core of threshold network flow games
MFCS'11 Proceedings of the 36th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Inetlligence and Machine Learning)
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We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition@?s agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, such as testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core and core-related solution concepts, and computing power indices such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf power index.