Data structures and network algorithms
Data structures and network algorithms
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Computing the Banzhaf power index in network flow games
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
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Network flow games model domains where a commodity can flow through a network controlled by selfish agents. Threshold Network Flow Games (TNFGs) are a form of such games where an agent coalition wins if it manages to send a flow exceeding a certain threshold between a source and a target vertex. Cooperative game theory predicts the agents' actions in such settings with solutions such as the core, the set of stable distributions of a coalition's gains among its members. However, some games have empty cores, so every distribution is inherently unstable. When the core is empty, one must use a more relaxed notion of stability, such as the least-core. We examine several problems regarding the leastcore in general and restricted TNFGs.