Deals among rational agents

  • Authors:
  • Jeffrey S. Rosenschein;Michael R. Genesereth

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California;Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California

  • Venue:
  • IJCAI'85 Proceedings of the 9th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
  • Year:
  • 1985

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Abstract

A formal framework is presented that models communication and promises in multi-agent interactions. This framework generalizes previous work on cooperation without communication, and shows the ability of communication to resolve conflicts among agents having disparate goals. Using a deal-making mechanism, agents are able to coordinate and cooperate more easily than in the communication-free model. In addition, there arc certain types of interactions where communication makes possible mutually beneficial activity that is otherwise impossible to coordinate.