NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
International Journal of Game Theory
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Mathematics of Operations Research
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Organizational structures supported by agent-oriented methodologies
Journal of Systems and Software
Coalition formation and price of anarchy in cournot oligopolies
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
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Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process---while more robust and democratic---may lead to a loss of efficiency compared to a centralized solution. To quantify this loss, we introduce the notion of the Price of Democracy (PoD), which measures the amount of resources needlessly committed to the task(s) at hand. After defining this concept for general coalitional games, we instantiate it in the setting of weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of coalitional games that can be used to model resource allocation in multiagent scenarios. We approach the problem of forming winning coalitions in this setting from a non-cooperative perspective, and put forward an intuitive deterministic bargaining process, which exhibits no delay of agreement (i.e., the agents are guaranteed to form a winning coalition in round one) and allows for efficient computation of bargaining strategies. We show a tight bound of 3/2 on the PoD of our process if two rounds of bargaining are allowed, and demonstrate that this bound cannot improve with more rounds. We then generalize our bargaining process to settings where multiple coalitions are allowed to be formed, show that this generalization also exhibits no delay of agreement, and discuss the PoD in such settings.