Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Prediction, Learning, and Games
Prediction, Learning, and Games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
On the convergence of regret minimization dynamics in concave games
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of democracy in coalition formation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
No regret learning in oligopolies: cournot vs. bertrand
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The price of anarchy of cournot oligopoly
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Computer Science Review
Beating the best Nash without regret
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On a generalized Cournot oligopolistic competition game
Journal of Global Optimization
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Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the negative externalities they impose on each other. Such behaviors generally lead to inefficient outcomes where the social welfare is bounded away from its optimal value. However, in practice, self-interested individuals explore the possibility of circumventing such negative externalities by forming coalitions. What sort of coalitions should we expect to arise? How do they affect the social welfare? We study these questions in the setting of Cournot markets, one of the most prevalent models of firm competition. Our model of coalition formation has two dynamic aspects. First, agents choose strategically how to update the current coalition partition. Furthermore, coalitions compete repeatedly between themselves trying to minimize their longterm regret. We prove tight bounds on the social welfare, which are significantly higher than that of the Nash equilibria of the original game. Furthermore, this improvement in performance is robust across different supply-demand curves and depends only on the size of the market.