Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
International Journal of Game Theory
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions
IEEE Internet Computing
Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A kernel-oriented model for coalition-formation in general environments: implementation and results
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
General principles of learning-based multi-agent systems
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
Optimal sequencing of individually rational contracts
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Designing agent collectives for systems with markovian dynamics
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 3
Non-cooperative dynamics of multi-agent teams
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 3
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Cognition, Sociability, and Constraints
Balancing Reactivity and Social Deliberation in Multi-Agent Systems, From RoboCup to Real-World Applications (selected papers from the ECAI 2000 Workshop and additional contributions)
Integrating Conversational Interaction and Constraint Based Reasoning in an Agent Building Shell
Revised Papers from the International Workshop on Infrastructure for Multi-Agent Systems: Infrastructure for Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Scalable Multi-Agent Systems
The design of collectives of agents to control non-Markovian systems
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Coalition formation mechanism in multi-agent systems based on genetic algorithms
Applied Soft Computing
Multi-task overlapping coalition parallel formation algorithm
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Collective intelligence, data routing and braess' paradox
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Searching for agent coalition using particle swarm optimization and death penalty function
ICIC'07 Proceedings of the intelligent computing 3rd international conference on Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications
A novel agent coalition generation method based on fuzzy set theory
LSMS'07 Proceedings of the Life system modeling and simulation 2007 international conference on Bio-Inspired computational intelligence and applications
Coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with mixed externalities
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Forming buyer coalition with bundles of items by ant colony optimization
ICCC'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Computers and computing
A distributed branch-and-bound algorithm for computing optimal coalition structures
SETN'06 Proceedings of the 4th Helenic conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
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Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One would prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. But then, can the coalition structure found via a partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum?We show that none of the previous coalition structure generation algorithms can establish any bound because they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show necessary for establishing a bound. We present an algorithm that establishes a tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show that any other algorithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to be searched approaches zero as the number of agents grows.If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm searches further, and establishes a progressively lower tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm lowers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits diminishing returns to computation. It also drastically outperforms its obvious contenders. Finally, we show how to distribute the desired search across self-interested manipulative agents.