Coalition formation among rational information agents
MAAMAW '96 Proceedings of the 7th European workshop on Modelling autonomous agents in a multi-agent world : agents breaking away: agents breaking away
Growing artificial societies: social science from the bottom up
Growing artificial societies: social science from the bottom up
Fluctuating efforts and sustainable cooperation
Simulating organizations
Anytime coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
A case study on social network in a computer game
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Group formation with split rule in social dilemmas
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
An investigation into the use of group dynamics for solving social dilemmas
MABS'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Multi-Agent and Multi-Agent-Based Simulation
Coordination, conventions and the self-organisation of sustainable institutions
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agents in Principle, Agents in Practice
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS) - Special Section: Extended Version of SASO 2011 Best Paper
The application of particle swarm optimisation in organisational behaviour
International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing
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Results on the formation of multi-agent teams are reviewed and extended. Conditions are specified under which it is individually rational for agents to spontaneously form coalitions in order to engage in collective action. In a cooperative setting the formation of such groups is to be expected. Here we show that in non-cooperative environments-presumably a more realistic context for a variety of both human and software agents-self-organized coalitions are capable of extracting welfare improvements. The Nash equilibria of these coalitional formation games are demon-strated e either long-lived or transient. The macroscopic structure of these emergent 'bands' of agents is stationary in sufficiently large populations, despite constant adaptation at the agent level. It is argued that assumptions concerning attainment of agent-level (Nash) equilibrium, so ubiquitous in conventional economics and game theory, are difficult to justify behaviorally and highly restrictive theoretically, and are thus unlikely to serve either as fertile design objectives or robust operating principles for realistic multi-agent systems.