Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anytime coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Contracting with uncertain level of trust
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Using Agents to Enable Collaborative Work
IEEE Internet Computing
Agents in E-commerce: state of the art
Knowledge and Information Systems
Time-Bounded Negation Framework for Multi-Agent Coordination
PRIMA '98 Selected papers from the First Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, Multiagent Platforms
Rational Exchange - A Formal Model Based on Game Theory
WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
Guaranteeing Properties for E-commerce Systems
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
A Formal Analysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
A formal model of rational exchange and its application to the analysis of Syverson's protocol
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Making markets and democracy work: a story of incentives and computing
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
A dialogue games framework for the operational semantics of logic agent-oriented languages
CLIMA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
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Electronic commerce currently relies on traditional third party enforcement mechanisms that don't necessarily translate well to cyberspace. Chunking algorithms offer one possibility for unenforced transactions between self motivated agents. This method enables transactions in settings where the parties cannot identify each other, or where litigation is not viable. It also allows computational agents to be more autonomous by not requiring them to be strictly tied to the real world parties they represent. In cases where this type of unenforced exchange is possible, it is preferable to the strictly enforced mode of exchange because it saves enforcement costs (for example, litigation costs or operations costs of trusted third party intermediaries) and it is insensitive to enforcement uncertainties. The method is based on managing the exchange between two agents-a supplier and a demander-so that the gains from completing the exchange (cooperating according to a contract) at any point are larger for both agents than the gains from terminating it (defecting the exchange prematurely by vanishing)