On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computing the Banzhaf power index in network flow games
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the dimensionality of voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Belief-based stability in non-transferable utility coalition formation with uncertainty
Intelligent Decision Technologies
Concise characteristic function representations in coalitional games based on agent types
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Information Systems Frontiers
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We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coalitional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coalition structures. For simple games without coalition structures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core nonemptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games.