Reasoning about knowledge
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
A stable and efficient buyer coalition formation scheme for e-marketplaces
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Fuzzy kernel-stable coalitions between rational agents
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mechanisms for coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Coalitional bargaining with agent type uncertainty
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Simple coalitional games with beliefs
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Non-transferable utility coalitional games via mixed-integer linear constraints
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
ICLA'11 Proceedings of the 4th Indian conference on Logic and its applications
Belief-based stability in non-transferable utility coalition formation with uncertainty
Intelligent Decision Technologies
Pareto Optimal Allocation in Multi-agent Coalitional Games with Non-linear Payoffs
ASONAM '12 Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM 2012)
Information Systems Frontiers
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We introduce Bayesian Coalitional Games (BCGs), a generalization of classical coalitional games to settings with uncertainties. We define the semantics of BCG using the partition model, and generalize the notion of payoffs to contracts among agents. To analyze these games, we extend the solution concept of the core under three natural interpretations-- ex ante, ex interim, and ex post--which coincide with the classical definition of the core when there is no uncertainty. In the special case where agents are risk-neutral, we show that checking for core emptiness under all three interpretations can be simplified to linear feasibility problems similar to that of their classical counterpart.