Fuzzy sets and applications
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
On Safe Kernel Stable Coalition Forming among Agents
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Heuristics for Dealing with a Shrinking Pie in Agent Coalition Formation
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Towards Agent-Based Coalition Formation for Service Composition
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Coalition Formation: Towards Feasible Solutions
Fundamenta Informaticae - Multiagent Systems (FAMAS'03)
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Who Works Together in Agent Coalition Formation?
CIA '07 Proceedings of the 11th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XI
Overlapping Coalition Formation
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Sequentially optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Risk-bounded formation of fuzzy coalitions among service agents
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
Coalition Formation: Towards Feasible Solutions
Fundamenta Informaticae - Multiagent Systems (FAMAS'03)
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A large variety of solutions exists for the problem of coalition formation among autonomous agents, at the theoretical level within game theory, and at the practical, algorithmic level, within multi-agent systems. However, one major underlying assumption of algorithmic solutions suggested to date is that the values of the coalitions are known and are certain at the time of coalition formation negotiation. In many practical cases such as in open, dynamically changing environments this assumption does not hold. In this paper we propose an algorithmic solution to the coalition formation problem that overcomes this limitation of previous solutions. Our solution supports fuzzy coalition values and allows agents to form stable coalition configurations. For this, we combine concepts from the theory of fuzzy sets with the game-theoretic stability concept of the Kernel to deduce the new concept of a fuzzy Kernel. We further provide a low-complexity algorithm for forming fuzzy Kernel stable coalitions among agents.